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JUSTICE BERYL LEVINE:
TAKING HER TITLE SERIOUSLY
IN NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL CASES
THOMAS M. LocKNEY*
The Law Review asked me to comment on Justice Beryl Levine's
contribution to the criminal law jurisprudence of North Dakota. I am
happy to oblige because I will miss her judicial presence in our state
legal community. She made a difference.
Typical for such law review tribute issues is a series of laudatory
personal reflections by persons who know the subject of the accolades
well. For judges, the usual cast of characters includes judicial colleagues,
former law clerks, colleagues from previous professional practice, and
professors with fond memories of the retiree as a student. Such casting
excludes me.l Moreover, my own record of commentary in this very
review would not lead anyone to seek me out as a likely source for kind
words about the work of the North Dakota Supreme Court. 2 Even worse,
my most recent viewpoint was a very critical slicing and dicing of the
Court's 3 opinion in State v. Knudson4 written by none other than the
honored retiree herself, Justice Levine. 5
* Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand Forks, North Dakota;
Municipal Judge, Emerado and Larimore, North Dakota; L.L.M., 1974, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts; J.D., 1970, University of Texas, Austin; B.A., 1967, University of
Wisconsin, Madison.
1. Although her first two years as a student at UND School of Law corresponded to my first two
years as a teacher, she managed to avoid taking any courses from me, and then, in her third year, I
was away on sabbatical.
2. Thomas M. Lockney, Probable Cause for Nighttime, No-knock Drug Searches: The Illusion of
Judicial Control in North Dakota, 69 N.D. L. REV. 613 (1993) [hereinafter Lockney, Probable Cause];
Thomas M. Lockney, An Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning Search and
Seizure Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 62 N.D. L. REV. 17 (1986) [hereinafter Lockney, Open
Letter]; Thomas M. Lockney, Perspectives on State v. Nagel: The North Dakota Supreme Court's
Discordant Medley of Fourth Amendment Doctrines, 58 N.D. L. REV. 727 (1982) [hereinafter
Lockney, Perspectives].
3. I have obtained permission from the editors to use my own convention, which is to capitalize
"Court" when referring to our own North Dakota Supreme Court in a North Dakota context. This is a
mark of my respect for the Court despite what its members might believe should they read the essays
cited in footnote 2, supra. Thus, throughout this article, I will use "Court" to signify the North Dakota
Supreme Court unless specifically or contextually indicated otherwise. For evidence of increasing law
review flexibility, compare this footnote with Lockney, Probable Cause, supra note 2, at 613, n.I.
4. 499 N.W.2d 872 (N.D.1993). State v. Knudson is criticized in Lockney, Probable Cause,
supra note 2.
5. It remains a mystery whether the law review solicited me because they assumed I should
make amends to Justice Levine for that critique, because they were blissfully unaware of it, or
perhaps just because they knew I have more than passing interest in the course of North Dakota
criminal law.
For the record, a convenient way to introduce a shameless plug, I will remind the most probable
readers of this essay that from 1980 to 1989, and again each year since 1993, I have presented a
yearly continuing legal education (CLE) Criminal Practice Seminar for North Dakota lawyers. At
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In any event, I submit that my attack on the Knudson opinion is the
best evidence of some objectivity in this more general retrospective on
Justice Levine's contributions. No reader of that viewpoint could
possibly believe that I am a mere shill for the merits of Justice Levine's
judicial opinions! My previous criticism should lend credibility to my
praise upon the occasion of her retirement. But prior criticism and a
claim to some objectivity hardly specify criteria for evaluation of an
appellate judge. Why are some judges considered great and others
merely good, mediocre, or poor? That question has perplexed many
great writers, and I am not immodest enough to suggest definitive
criteria. Instead, I first catalog some reasons why I will miss Justice
Levine's presence on our court, interspersed with description of her
work, including some critique and suggestions for her successors, and
conclude with some comments on why others should miss her too. All in
all I hope to support my evaluation of her as a great appellate judge.
I will miss her because: 6
SHE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON HER JUDICIAL COLLEAGUES
Although I have lived in North Dakota since 1971, it wasn't until
1980 that I began to follow carefully the criminal law opinions of the
North Dakota Supreme Court. 7 Justice Levine's first criminal law
opinion, in April of 1985, came after I had been regularly reviewing the
Court's work for about five years. 8 My general impression was a Court
with a tendency to write opinions either shockingly or laughably re-
sult-oriented, depending on your degree of sanguinity. The Court
appeared to see its primary function as the expeditious affirmance of
criminal convictions presumably to save its intellectual energy for civil
cases. 9 Appellate court law-guidance-avoidance-devices such as harm-
less error and the abuse of discretion standard were routinely used, and
when the Court took positions on substantive issues, dissent was rare.
each seminar, I distribute a summary of the prior year's North Dakota Supreme Court opinions of
interest to criminal lawyers.
6. As a personal matter, in addition to the professional reasons set forth in the text, I will miss
Justice Levine because of her gracious acceptance of criticism. She took the work of the Court and
the craft of judging very seriously. I was always pleased, but sometimes surprised, that she never
appeared to be at all put off by critical commentary from the academy. She suffered in judicious
silence my attempt to skewer the Knudson opinion while she remained personally cordial. She
continued to attend my annual CLE seminars, voluntarily subjecting herself to three hours of fault
finding with her work and that of her colleagues. Justice Levine took my written critique and oral
carping with good humor and appropriate seriousness. An academic critic could ask for no more.
7. See supra note 5 (describing yearly CLE seminars).
8. State v. Patten, 366 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1985).
9. At least I cheerfully assume that energy was expended in other areas because I confess I
wasn't following the run of non-criminal cases.
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Indeed, I will confess that occasionally I wondered whether the four
concurring judges had actually read the opinion they had signed.O
With the appointments of Justice Levine, and Justice Meschke in the
same year, the quality of the Court's opinions soon improved signifi-
cantly. Justice Levine played a major role in the progress. Her primary
role was to motivate the Court to take criminal cases more seriously,
especially those involving constitutional issues. Her majority opinions
served as models of judicial craft and her dissents contributed to her
colleagues' increased efforts to produce persuasive opinions.
JUSTICE LEVINE BELIEVED IN "TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY"'
12
Her most significant contributions were her opinions, both majority
and dissenting, in cases raising Constitutional issues because she took
them very seriously.
Search and Seizure
Perhaps her greatest contribution was in the area of search and
seizure law and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported be Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.13
This single sentence amendment to the Constitution has resulted in a
remarkable volume of decisions regulating law enforcement searches
and seizures from all courts, foremost the United States Supreme Court,
but also including our own Court.
In a nutshell, the basic Fourth Amendment framework established
by United States Supreme Court opinions requires reasonable searches
and seizures. Reasonableness generally requires a degree of certainty
that the place being searched or the thing or person being seized are
proper subjects. Usually we call that level of proof probable cause, using
the language of the Fourth Amendment itself. But for less intrusive
Fourth Amendment activity, sometimes a lower standard, reasonable
suspicion, is sufficient; and sometimes, as explained below, no specific
degree of certainty of criminality as to the particular object of the police
10. E.g., State v. Wetsch, 304 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1981).
!1. Both took their oath of office on February 8, 1985.
12. The phrase is taken from Ronald Dworkin's book of the same name: TAKNG RioGrrs
SFRIOUSLY (1977).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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activity is required at all. In addition, there is a preference for warrants;
police belief that the object of the seizure or search is a criminal or evi-
dence of a crime should be reviewed by a magistrate who, if in agree-
ment, issues a warrant. Thus, Fourth Amendment police activity should
be pursuant to a warrant or fit within a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. These rules are enforced by the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule. The rules for search and seizure have provided
frequent grist for our Court's mill. Justice Levine ground it out with the
best of them.
Probable Cause
The United States Supreme Court has struggled mightily for years
to define or articulate the bounds of probable cause, the level of certain-
ty required for a garden variety search or seizure. Information from
confidential informants is often offered to support probable cause. For
years, the United States Supreme Court relied on the so-called Aguilar-
Spinelli test 14 which required that probable cause be based in such cases
upon an adequate showing of the informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge. A failure to show the truthfulness of the tipster could be
remedied by police corroboration. A failure to show how the truthful
informant obtained the information could be cured by sufficient detail
to indicate the information was first hand. 15
Dissatisfaction with perceived rigidity in its own test led the United
States Supreme Court to abandon the test in favor of a more flexible
"totality of circumstances" approach in 1983 in Illinois v. Gates,16 two
years before Justice Levine was appointed to our Court. Because state
supreme courts can provide greater protection under their state constitu-
tions, our Court was presented in State v. Thompson 17 soon after Gates,
with the question of whether the Aguilar-Spinelli test should be main-
tained as a matter of North Dakota interpretation of Article I, Section 8
of the North Dakota Constitution.18 Without deciding whether the Gates
totality of circumstances approach had replaced Aguilar-Spinnelli's two
14. The test derives from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
15. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
16. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). I employ the word approach rather than test, because the former test is
subsumed into the totality of the circumstances so that veracity and the basis of knowledge of the
informant become relevant, but not controlling, circumstances.
17. 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985).
18. Article 1, § 8 provides, in language very close to that of the Fourth Amendment:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall be issued
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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prongs, the Court found, just four months after Justice Levine's appoint-
ment, that the informant's tip in Thompson failed both tests. 19
Justice Levine, concurring specially, cautioned that the Court's state-
ments about the Gates standard were mere dicta rather than a prohibited
advisory opinion. 20 She then lobbied in favor of "North Dakota's
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines [which] do not appear to have been applied
in a 'hypertechnical' or 'unduly rigid' manner." 21 She concluded that
to "resort to Gates may be akin to summoning the repairman to fix what
'ain't broke."' 22
Justice Levine's brief in Thompson against Gates as "an unwise evi-
sceration of the Aguilar-Spinelli probable cause standard which has well
served North Dakota in effectuating the safeguards contained in Article
I, Section 8, of the North Dakota Constitution" 23 was repeated six years
later in her concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Ringquist.24
She concurred in the result, but dissented from adoption of the Gates
probable cause approach. 25 Her Ringquist opinion provides a thorough
scholarly argument in favor of a higher standard for probable cause
under North Dakota's Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. 26
After five years of dissent, in 1990 she threw in the towel in typical
Levine common sense prose:
I give up. Notwithstanding the position I urged in State v.
Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 217 (N.D. 1988) (Levine, J.,
concurring and dissenting), namely, that we reject the Gates
totality-of-the-circumstances test and continue to adhere to the
Aguilar-Spinelli probable cause standard under our state consti-
tution, henceforth, I will meekly join in the majority rationale
which adopts and applies Gates. I cannot resist pointing out
that, as usual, the results under the Gates totality-of-
circumstances rule are not noticeably different from our
common-sense application of Aguilar-Spinelli. I regret that
the delicate balance of federalism is askew in North Dakota.27
Justice Levine did her best to make sure that, even under Gates,
probable cause would not be a sure thing for the State in North Dakota.
For example, we can look at Justice Levine's opinion for the Court in
19. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985).
20. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d at 372-73 (Levine, J., concurring specially).
21. Id. at 373 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 273 (1983) (White, J., concurring)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. 433 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1988).
25. State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207,217-20 (N.D. 1988).
26. Id.
27. State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d 490, 501 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J., concurring).
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State v. Lewis.28 In Lewis, a police officer who had experience with nar-
cotics investigations, including personal involvement in about fifteen
indoor marijuana growing operations, testified in support of a warrant to
search defendants' residence that a federal agent had disclosed that
defendant husband had received several items by mail from a growing
supply store in Arizona. 29 The items were consistent with indoor grow-
ing of marijuana and the officer found out that defendant husband was
the only person with his name living in the county.3 0 Two officers
conducted a visual inspection of defendants' residence using a thermal
imaging device which showed unusual heat loss from the second story.
31
Further visual inspection showed that windows above the area of heat loss
were covered with Styrofoam insulation and another window was covered
with fiberglass insulation, while windows on the other side, showing
normal heat loss, were not covered. 32 Inspection of electrical consump-
tion records showed that consumption on the farmstead was "small"
(70-700 kilowatt hours per month) from April to September, but
"jumped" up to 1700 and averaged about 1600 from that point until
the next April when the warrant was obtained. 3
3
The agent testified that such consumption was "excessive" for a
family of four with a fuel oil furnace, no central air conditioning, and no
other outbuildings.3 4 He also testified that he had learned from another
officer that an untested informant had said that someone in town said
that there was an indoor growing operation in the area and that the past
weekend they couldn't buy any marijuana but were expecting a
harvest.35 The magistrate asked the officer if he was "convinced that the
man is not growing tomatoes" and the officer responded:
Yes. The fact that the windo[w]s are covered indicates to me a
need for privacy and not wanting anybody to see what's going
on even though it was on a second story window, and that the
two windows were covered on the part of the house where the
hot spots were, and the two windows weren't covered on the
part of the house where the hot spots weren't. That indicates to
me that they're hiding something or attempting to hide
something .36
28. 527 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1995).
29. State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658,659-60 (N.D. 1995).






36. Id. at 660-61 (alteration in original).
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During the preliminary hearing, the sheriff, who had assisted in the
investigation, testified that he told the officer who obtained the warrant
that defendant wife was known as "the plant lady" and that he knew she
had a lot of plants, and that he told him it was possible "she's growing
Boston ferns, tomatoes." 37 That information, from the sheriff, was not
presented by the officer to the magistrate. 38
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the case was not
materially different from State v. Ennen,39 and reversed for lack of
probable cause.4 0 The equipment purchased was consistent with illegal
growing, but was not itself shown to be illegal.4 1 Thus the evidence
failed to show the required "nexus between the home to be searched and
the contraband sought." 42 The information from the anonymous and
untested informant both failed to implicate the defendant and moreover
lacked the required "information from which one may conclude that the
informant is honest and his information reliable, or from which the
informant's basis of knowledge can be assessed." 43 The observations
also failed to supply the required nexus because weatherproofing for
winter is common in North Dakota. 44 The Court refused "to view
diligent efforts to reduce heat loss, without more, as circumstantial
evidence of an indoor marijuana grow operation." 45
When disagreeing with a majority opinion finding probable cause,
Justice Levine could be scathing in dissent. In State v. Frohlich ,6 the
Court held that probable cause existed for a search warrant authorizing
search of a car and an apartment based upon fruits of theft found in a
dumpster outside defendant's apartment; evidence that two young men
took a package that looked like a wrapped rifle with scope (reported
stolen) from the apartment to the car parked nearby; that the car was
registered to defendant's parents; and that defendant lived in the
apartment. 47 Justice Levine minced no words in her dissent:
37. Id. at 661.
38. Id.
39. 496 N.W.2d 46 (N.D. 1993). Ennen indicated an equally stringent view of probable cause
from the then newest Justice on the Court, Justice Sandstrom.
40. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d at 663.
41. Id. at 662.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1985)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 663. By finding a lack of probable cause, the Court was able to avoid the other difficult
and interesting issues raised in the case. The defendants also objected to the thermal imaging as a
warrantless search, id. at 661, and claimed that the information about Mrs. Lewis being the "plant
lady" was intentionally or recklessly withheld and mislead the magistrate, id. (this would arguably be
in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). The prosecution argued that even if there is
was no probable cause, the Court should recognize a Leon-like good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule under the North Dakota Constitution. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d at 663.
46. 506 N.W.2d 729 (N.D. 1993).
47. State v. Frohlich, 506 N.W.2d 729, 730-31 (N.D. 1993).
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This case is terribly disconcerting. Too many people used
or had access to the dumpster and too many people are in com-
parable positions in our society. Too little evidence, indeed
none at all, links the stolen property in the dumpster to the
defendant in his apartment, unless probable cause is to be di-
luted, as it was in this case, in all cases involving young people
who "sleep all day" and have friends over in the evening.
... The majority's decision puts the sanctity of the home and
the protection afforded it by the requirement of probable cause
at risk by relying on suspicion, speculation and conjecture to
establish probable cause and achieve a desired result.4 8
Reasonable Suspicion
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court determined in Terry v.
Ohio,49 that some police activity, investigative stops, now called
Terry-stops, could be done for reasons that fall short of probable cause,
calling the lower quantum of evidence reasonable, or articulable, or
objective suspicion.50 In 1969, one year after Terry, the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly passed a statute authorizing North Dakota law
enforcement officers to make investigatory stops based upon reasonable
suspicion for felonies and specified serious misdemeanors. 51 The statute
lay dormant for years, apparently ignored by North Dakota police,
lawyers, and judges.
In the meantime, our Court blithely permitted investigatory stops on
reasonable suspicion for misdemeanors not authorized by section
29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code. The Court began in 1969
48. Id. at 736.
49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968).
51. Currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991). The statute provides:
A peace officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit:
I. Any felony.
2. A misdemeanor relating to the possession of a concealed or
dangerous weapon or weapons.
3. Burglary or unlawful entry.
4. A violation of any provision relating to possession of marijuana or of
narcotic, hallucinogenic, depressant, or stimulant drugs.
The peace officer may demand of such person his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions. When a peace officer has stopped a person for questioning
pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he
may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the peace officer finds such a
weapon or any other thing, the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it,
if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
974 [VOL. 72:967
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with Borman v. Tschida 52 where, apparently unaware of both Terry and
of section 29-29-21, it found that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to
stop a driver suspected of drunk driving.5 3 Subsequently, the Court
continued to apply the reasonable suspicion standard many times, never
noticing the apparent legislative limit of section 29-29-21.54
Incredibly, the statute continued to be ignored until its silver anni-
versary in 1994, when it was raised by the defendant in City of Bismarck
v. Uhden,55 not as a limit on a reasonable suspicion stop, but rather
against a sobriety checkpoint, in which cars were stopped based upon no
particular suspicion of any particular driver, 56 as approved under the
Fourth Amendment in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. 57 In
Uhden, the Court rejected the limitation argument and in essence held
that its previous twenty years of approving reasonable suspicion stops for
minor offenses not listed in section 29-29-21 had, in effect, superseded
the statute because of legislative acquiescence.Sg A less contrived way
for the Court to have reached the same result would have been to rule
that violation of the statute is not of constitutional magnitude and thus
exclusion of evidence as a remedy is unnecessary. 59 Instead of its
52. 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969).
53. The Court noted that "to the best of our knowledge, the Supreme Court of the United States
has not ruled directly on this question, but a number of state appellate courts have held that an officer
may stop a pedestrian or motorist under circumstances short of probable cause for arrest." Borman v.
Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757,761 (N.D. 1969).
54. See, e.g., City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 376 (N.D. 1994) (citing State v.
Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 602 (N.D. 1992) (applying reasonable and articulable suspicion in DUI
case); State v. Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1991) (applying reasonable and articulable suspicion in
DUI case); State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1984) (applying less than probable cause in
DUI case); State v. Kolb, 239 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976) (applying less than probable cause in DUI
case)).
55. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).
56. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 375-76 (N.D. 1994). The Court stated Uhden's
argument as an assertion
that section 29-29-21, NDCC, authorizes the stopping of motor vehicles on less than
probable cause, only in the limited circumstances listed in that section. He deduces that a
stop of an automobile for reasons other than those enumerated in section 29-29-21 is thus
illegal. Because police checkpoints necessarily involve stops based on less than probable
cause, indeed on no particular cause at all, Uhden argues that they are effectively
forbidden under section 29-28-21, NDCC.
Id.
57. 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
58. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 376. First, the Court observed that it was not clear that the legislature
intended to prohibit stops of motor vehicles on less than probable cause except as provided in the
statute. Id. (citing Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260, 263 (Kan. 1992)). Next the Court
relied on Blair v. City of Fargo for the proposition that:
Where courts of this State have construed statute and such construction is supported by
the long acquiescence on the part of the legislative assembly and by the failure of the
assembly to amend the law, it will be presumed that such interpretation of the statute is in
accordance with legislative intent.
Id. (citing Blair v. City of Fargo, 171 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1969)). The Court then concluded, as it had
impliedly done for years, "that section 29-29-21, NDCC, is not applicable to investigatory stops of
motor vehicles and therefore, does not itself prohibit law enforcement from using checkpoints." Id.
59. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusionary rule).
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strange acquiescence argument (in reality repeal by desuetude) or a
possible avoidance of the exclusionary remedy, a third way the Court
could have dodged the statute would have been to find that it merely
provides a non-exclusive list of some, but not all, grounds for reasonable
suspicion stops.60
Nowhere in the Uhden opinion is there any recognition of the
serious issue of whether the reasonable suspicion standard is appropriate
for minor offenses. Professor LaFave in his oft-cited treatise on search
and seizure discussing the nature of the suspected offense with relation
to the dimensions of a permissible stop states:
Consistent with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, may the police stop suspects for investigation
pursuant to Terry no matter how minor or insignificant the
offense under investigation? This issue has seldom been
confronted head on by the lower courts. Most of the decisions
upholding stops for investigations have involved suspected
criminal conduct of about the same seriousness as that involved
in Terry, though on occasion a stop has been given judicial
approval even though nothing more than a possible curfew
violation or smoking of a marijuana cigarette was involved.6 1
Indeed, Professor LaFave offers a North Dakota case as one of his
examples, and explains:
Although it is sometimes asserted "that traffic violations, even
if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct
and, therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion," State
v. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1990), the point there is
not that suspicion of such a minor violation permits a stop, but
rather that the actual commission of the violation justifies at
least a non-custodial arrest, during which a more serious
offense may come to light. In Stadsvold, for example, the stop
was for driving without lights, but it resulted in discovery of the
fact that defendant was driving while intoxicated. 62
Despite the Court's dictum in Uhden effectively repealing section
29-29-21 because of its long-standing authorization of reasonable
suspicion stops in minor cases, our Court has never analyzed the policies
60. That strained interpretation of the statute, given its language, is hinted at by the Court's
citation and parenthetical summary of Davis, the Kansas case. See Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 376 (citing
Davis, 843 P.2d at 263).
61. 4 W AYNE L AFAvE, SEARCH AND S EIZURE §9.2(c), at 28-29 (3d ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
As to the "often cited" comment, the author has personally seen at least 43 different North Dakota
Supreme Court opinions citing Professor LaFave's treatise, but in the interest of saving trees, the string
citation is omitted.
62. Id. at 29 n.44 (citing State v. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1990)).
976 [VOL. 72:967
JUSTICE BERYL LEVINE: CRIMINAL CASES
favoring them. Moreover, it has never recognized LaFave's point that
most such stops, including the one in Stadsvold, involve observation of
actual commission of an offense for which a defendant is stopped, i.e.,
probable cause, after which probable cause to arrest for a more serious
offense such as DUI may develop. 63 Even as perspicacious a judge as
Justice Levine, committed as she was to Fourth Amendment rights and
analysis, is limited to the points raised by attorneys. However, it is argu-
ably an important part of the Court's work to create a credible body of
law. It began its application of the lower, reasonable suspicion, standard
to less serious crimes at a time when the concept of a Fourth Amendment
standard below probable cause was a novelty and one can hardly fault
subsequent defense lawyers for failing to beat their heads against the
Court's precedential wall; and prosecutors were unlikely to question a
lower standard which simplified their work while increasing their sup-
pression hearing batting averages. It could, of course, be argued that the
distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion is too so-
phisticated or amorphous for the practical judgments required of police
officers in the field and judges subsequently reviewing those judgments
with sensitivity to officers' situation.
In any event, instead of justifying minor league stops for reasonable
suspicion, our Court, with nary a hiccup of concern from Justice Levine,
has applied the reasonable suspicion standard to a bewildering variety of
trivial offenses, including non-criminal traffic offenses. 64 In Stadsvold
itself, an opinion in which Justice Levine concurred, the Court could not
have been clearer, as it stated: "It is well settled that traffic violations,
even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and,
therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting
investigatory stops." 65 In support of this "well settled" rule, the Court
cited three federal circuit court of appeals cases, 66 and then added a
63. Id.
64. Just within the last few years, the Court has authorized reasonable suspicion stops for a
myriad of minor offenses. See State v. Burris, 545 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1996) (involving crossing of a
fog line); Zimmerman v. Dept. of Transp. Director, 543 N.W.2d 479, 481-82 (N.D. 1996) (regarding
crossing a center line); City of Grand Forks v. Egley, 542 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996) (regarding parking
after hours in a city park); State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390 (1995) (involving parking in violation of
state statute); State v. Ova, 539 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1995) (involving exhibition driving and/or driving
without requisite care, neither a criminal offense); State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D. 1995)
(involving swerving between the driving lane and the shoulder); City of Wahpeton v. Roles, 524
N.W.2d 598 (1994) (involving loud engine noise or rolling through a stop sign); Wolf v. North Dakota
Dep't of Transp., 523 N.W.2d 545, 547 (N.D. 1994) (involving exhibition driving).
65. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d at 296.
66. Id. (citing United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that common traffic
violations constituted criminal conduct and standing alone provided sufficient suspicion for an
investigatory stop); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that officers
were justified in conducting an investigatory stop having witnessed violations of traffic laws); United
States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that police may make an investigatory
stop of a vehicle when code violation is witnessed or suspected)). However, the first two cited cases,
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footnote noting the approval of police investigatory stops involving
various traffic violations.67
This combination of judicial repeal of a statute in Uhden and
consistent failure in many cases over many years to even discuss the
serious issue raised by Professor LaFave should be reconsidered. It is
bad policy, silly, and most often, unnecessary.
As to policy, after discussing the failure of the United States
Supreme Court to clarify whether Terry stops are limited to serious
crimes, LaFave, despite lower courts' tendencies to allow such stops for
minor crimes or indeed "even when the officers apparently had no idea
just what particular crime might have been committed," emphatically
states his own opinion: "The Terry rule should be expressly limited to
investigation of serious offenses." 68  He recognizes that it may be
difficult "to articulate offense-category limitations as a matter of Fourth
Amendment interpretation," 69 but that difficulty should be eased in
North Dakota where we have legislation, section 29-29-21, indicating a
judgment as to which offenses justify a reasonable suspicion stop.
Moreover, even if certain misdemeanors are thought to be serious
enough to add to the legislative list, a bright line could at least be drawn
between criminal offenses and non-criminal, or so-called administrative,
traffic offenses which are clearly identified in sections 39-06.1-02, -05
of the North Dakota Century Code.70
Whichever line is chosen, Professor LaFave offers three reasons why
developing such limitations is important. First, Terry's discount from
probable cause to reasonable suspicion is not needed for minor crimes.
Second, public confidence in the police is heightened and fear of abuse
is diminished if the extraordinary authority of Terry is not applied to the
diversity of minor crimes thus avoiding stops of a significant number of
innocent persons. Third, a limitation to serious offenses would minimize
"fishing expeditions for contraband," that is, the police will be less
tempted to stop as a pretext or subterfuge for a search.71
Fouche and Thompson, are similarly subject to LaFave's critique in that in both it was not suspicion of
the minor offense which justified the stop but actual commission. In Montgomery, the court actually
found that the police lacked even reasonable suspicion for their stop. 561 F.2d at 888.
67. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d at 296 n.1 (citing State v. Goeman, 431 N.W.2d 290 (N.D.1988)
(involving stop of car at a green light); State v. VandeHoven, 388 N.W.2d 857 (N.D.1986) (involving
vehicle crossing over centerline of highway); State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36 (N.D.1986) (involving
use of hand signals instead of turn signals and lack of rear lights on vehicle); State v. Klevgaard, 306
N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1981) (involving speeding)).
68. LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 32.
69. Id.
70. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10(3) which specifies points assessed against the
offenders record for two categories of offenses, subsubsection a, "Noncriminal Violations," and
subsubsection b, "Criminal Violations."
71. Id. at 32-33. Specifically, Professor LaFave argues:
(1) Terry utilizes a balancing approach whereby the need to seize and search is
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Ignoring these policy reasons and allowing reasonable suspicion
stops for an offense, including non-criminal traffic offenses, is often just
plain silly. In most traffic stops, there is nothing to investigate. The
officer usually has probable cause, which is why discounting the basis
for the stop to reasonable suspicion is unnecessary. As an example of
both the silliness and the lack of necessity, consider the decision in State
v Ova.72 In Ova, a highway patrol officer observed defendant's pickup
stopped on a gravel road at about 1:25 a.m. facing away about 25 to 30
feet from a paved road. 73 He observed it while it "began backing
rapidly in what [he] would term as exhibition or careless type driving
towards the paved road" and "accelerating rapidly" to about 20 miles
per hour.74 The officer saw "an unusual amount of dust" illuminated
by defendant's headlights and taillights, engulf the pickup. 75 Since it
was dark, the officer couldn't see the defendant's tires spinning, but
assumed she was skidding because of the amount of dust.76 While
issuing warnings for failure to drive in a careful and prudent manner, 77
balanced against the degree of intrusion which will result. The Court stressed that the
officer acted "to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps
to do so." The emphasis, therefore, was upon the need for immediate action, which
simply is not present as to minor crimes.
(2) Any extraordinary grant of police authority ought to be circumscribed in such
a way that meaningful review is possible and so that the public is not apprehensive about
police excesses. The circumstances which might lead an officer to suspect that a person
is committing such a crime as loitering, gambling or disorderly conduct "are sufficiently
diverse and diffuse that their inclusion might mean a large and hard-to-review expansion
of coercive authority." And it must be remembered that under a reasonable suspicion
test it is inevitable that a significant number of innocent persons will be stopped. But "if
persons come to understand that they are being subjected to inconvenience only in cases
where most persons would find such action proper and desirable, the cost of resentment
might well be reduced."
(3) Most important, as Judge Friendly emphasized, barring the police from
employing stop and frisk for such minor crimes as possession of narcotics will remove
the temptation for the police to go on fishing expeditions for contraband. Permitting stops
for narcotics offenses presents the most obvious temptation to abuse the frisk as an
occasion for searching for contraband. ["]There are, to be sure, a number of means for
dealing with the problem of abuse of the frisk (as opposed to the stop) in regard to
narcotics. . . . However .... it is preferable to deal with this problem by removing
narcotics offenses from the scope of the stop and frisk authority altogether.["]
Id. (footnotes omitted).
72. 539 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1995).




77. This offense is created by N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-09-01.1 and is commonly referred to as
"care required," the first two words in its title, words not repeated in the body of the statute itself. This
offense is to be distinguished from the more serious offense that precedes it in Title 39, section
39-09-01. Section 39-09-01's title is "Basic rule - Penalty for violation." Its body does, after a
laundry list of specific examples of ways in which a person may offend by driving "at a speed greater
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing," conclude that anyone so driving "has committed careless driving, and must be
assessed a fee of thirty dollars." Id. The care required offense specifies no penalty, but in but one of
many examples of Title 39's justified reputation for a very out of date, patchwork, confusing
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and for failure to change her driver's license address, he commented that
she "was spitting up the dust there pretty good," and her responses
conveyed the odor of alcohol leading to a DUI charge.78
The trial court found a lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop. 79
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court
had in effect applied the wrong legal standard, probable cause, instead of
the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard.80 The Supreme Court
determined that the trial court had believed the officer's testimony, and
that his "observation of rapid acceleration and excessive dust" constitut-
ed articulable facts.81 Coupled with the officer's reasonable inference
"based upon the officer's training and experience which may elude lay
persons," that the dust was caused by acceleration or spinning tires, the
officer reasonably suspected a traffic violation and thus the stop was
legal.82
The reason that I view the court's analysis as silly is because the
officer observed commission of the care required offense and therefore
had probable cause which justified stopping and ticketing Ova. The
stop, based on a level of evidence that would justify an arrest for a
criminal offense then, in LaFave's words regarding Stadsvold, "resulted
in discovery of the fact that defendant was driving while intoxicated." 83
What further investigation of the driving does the Court contemplate? A
confession to exhibition driving? The Ova opinion observed that "Ova
responded that her brakes kept sticking, but she did not deny or confirm
Beedy's observation."84
As a small town part-time municipal court judge for twenty years, I
find it droll to contemplate a patrol officer, as in Ova, following up his
comment to Ova that she "was spitting up the dust there pretty good,"
with an investigatory question, perhaps, "Ms. Ova, based on what I have
seen, I can write you a ticket for lack of required care, or [as was done in
mishmash, one must turn to another chapter to discover section 39-06.1-06(5) which indicates that
violation of section 39-09-01.1 merits "a fee of not less than ten dollars nor more than thirty dollars."
I occasionally fantasize an experiment in which various descriptions of bad driving would be
shown to the proverbial college class of experimental guinea pigs, who would then be given the
wording of these two offenses and asked to try to determine which one applied to which driving
offenses. My fantasized conclusion is that the experimental subjects would have no more of a clue
than I do as a municipal judge; all I can deduce is that some minor bad driving, less dangerous than
the criminal offense of reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor prohibited by section 39-08-03, merit
a $30 fine, whereas others, merit a fine of somewhere between $10 to $30. Such linguistic
legerdemain would, I hope, not be tolerated if serious penalties were involved; but, for these
non-criminal offenses. I have no reason to believe the vagueness issue has been seriously raised in our
courts. See the discussion of the vagueness doctrine infra at notes 231-33.
78. Ova, 539 N.W.2d at 858.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 859.
81. Id. at 860.
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. See LAFAVE, supra note 61. at 29 n.44.
84. Ova, 539 N.W.2d at 858.
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the case] give you a warning ticket, but I want to investigate exhibition
driving, so, were you or were you not driving your vehicle in a manner
which disturbed the peace by creating or causing unnecessary engine
noise, tire squeal, skid, or slide upon acceleration or braking?" 85 I have
never heard of an officer seeking, much less obtaining, a confession to
exhibition driving or driving with insufficient care. The reality in Ova, a
typical case rather than any investigatory fantasy, was described by the
Court itself:
Because of the time of night, the location where he spotted the
pickup, and the manner of driving, Beedy [the officer] testified
that he thought that there was a possibility of drinking activity
in the pickup. Although the possibility was a factor in his
decision to stop the pickup, Beedy testified that he stopped the
vehicle based upon his observations of rapid acceleration and
excessive dust which he testified made him suspect "exhibi-
tion/careless driving," emphasizing that "it was just the manner
that she was driving; the careless manner that brought my
attention to her vehicle." Beedy testified that he checked
"erratic driving" as his basis for reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicle based upon his observations. 86
Justice Levine dissented because she felt the Court gave insufficient
deference to the trial court's finding a lack of reasonable suspicion. 87
Unfortunately, her dispute with the majority about the legal standard and
factual basis for the trial court's suppression ignores the conceptual diffi-
culty with attempting to apply a reasonable suspicion standard to a situa-
tion where the officer had probable cause to stop for a traffic offense.
A true case of suspected drunk driving might be an exception to my
claim that the reasonable suspicion standard is generally unjustified and
unnecessary for minor crimes. Occasionally, an officer may observe
driving that raises a reasonable, suspicion of impairment but requires a
stop to check out absent probable cause to stop for a violation of a
traffic offense. Given the extensive range of traffic offenses for which
one may be stopped, it is hard to imagine the situation arising often. But
in any e'vent, the issue should be confronted' in light of the policy
reasons asserted by LaFave and if the balance is struck in favor of
allowing reasonable suspicion stops, the remedy then is to amend section
29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code to include DUI.
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-03.1(2b) (providing in pertinent part that "'Exhibition driving'
means driving a vehicle in a manner which disturbs the peace by creating or causing unnecessary
engine noise, tire squeal, skid, or slide upon acceleration or braking").
86. Ova, 539 N.w.2d at 858.
87. Id. at 862 (Levine, J., dissenting).
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. The Court's advice about section 29-29-21 in Uhden is dictum,
dictum with which Justice Levine unfortunately explicitly concurred. 88
It is dictum because the facts of the case did not involve a reasonable
suspicion stop by the police, but instead, a sobriety check point, which
requires no suspicion at all. Our Court should come to its senses soon in
light of the pretext cases, where Justice Levine lead the way in North
Dakota.
Pretext or Subterfuge
At the time Justice Levine wrote the Court's opinion in State v.
Kunkel,89 the United States Supreme Court had never directly held that a
valid stop, arrest, or search could be invalidated because it was done as a
pretext or subterfuge for some other, illegal, reason. In Kunkel, the
police wanted to search a van they suspected would contain illegal
drugs. 90 Lacking probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the van,
they obtained an arrest warrant based on an earlier drug sale for one
McGath, who they believed would be in the van. 91 The police stopped
the van and arrested McGath; Kunkel, who owned the van, and two
passengers were released. 92 The van was impounded and during an
inventory search marijuana was discovered. 93 A warrant was obtained to
search the van further, more drugs were discovered, Kunkel was arrested,
and subsequently even more drugs were found in a warranted search of
his residence. 94
The North Dakota Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide
whether McGath's arrest was pretextual because even if not, the search of
the van after impoundment wasn't incident to the arrest.95 The Court
rejected the State's alternative argument, that the search was a proper
inventory search, because it "was conducted for the purpose of criminal
investigation rather than for the protection of property," and thus was a
subterfuge. 96 Justice Levine explained that: "The inventory search was
conducted to discover evidence of crime and not to fulfill a caretaking
function. . . .But it is the caretaking function which legitimizes an
inventory. Absent that justification, an inventory is unreasonable and is
88. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 382 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., concurring) ("I
agree with the majority's resolution of the statutory argument.").
89. 455 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1990).





95. Id. at 210.
96. Id. at 210-11.
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an impermissible warrantless search in contravention of the fourth
amendment."97
In State v. Everson,98 the Court upheld a checkpoint procedure on
Highway 85 for controlled substances. 99 The ostensible registration and
equipment checks were admittedly conducted in order to find drugs
going to or coming from the annual Sturgis motorcycle rally.100 Analo-
gizing to the then recently decided case of Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz,101 the Court found the State's interests in fighting
drugs and in safe highways outweighed the interference with individual
liberty.' 0 2 Justice Levine disagreed.103 She argued in dissent that since
the police "admitted using the safety inspection in order to achieve their
purpose of 'alleviating' the drug problem,"104 the Court should reach
"an analogous result" to Kunkel.105
Recently, in United States v. Whren,106 the United States Supreme
Court unanimously rejected the pretext argument for a traffic stop based
upon probable cause. 107 In Whren, the Court left open the possibility of
pretext arguments for cases not involving probable cause. 108 The Whren
opinion expressly reserves the possibility of three exceptions to its
rejection of the pretext doctrine: stops based on race;109 situations
portending very great harm to the individual, such as deadly force, entry
into homes without warrants, and physical penetration of the body;l10
and third, searches or seizures based on less than probable cause, for
example, inventory and inspection searches.Il In Zimmerman v. Depart-
ment of Transportation Director,12 our Court seems to have anticipated
the death of the federal pretext doctrine in Whren.113 But since Zimmer-
man, according to our Court, involved a reasonable suspicion stop, it
remains to be seen whether our Court will observe the distinction from
Whren which was explicitly based on the existence of probable cause.1 14
97. Id. at 211.
98. 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
99. State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 703 (N.D. 1991).
100. Id. at 696, 703.
101. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
102. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 703.
103. Id. at 704-06 (Levine, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 705.
105. Id. at 706.
106. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
107. United States v. Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1774.
110. Id. at 1776.
111. Id. at 1773.
112. 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1996).
113. Zimmerman v. Department of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d 479.482-83 (N.D.1996).
114. If the Court wishes to avoid pretext arguments in the cases for which they are most
appropriate, minor traffic stops, it must reconsider its misdemeanor and non-criminal traffic stop line
of cases and its promiscuous permissiveness for reasonable suspicion stops for trivial cases contrary to
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Despite Justice Levine's unfortunate lapse in her role as the Court's
search and seizure law watchdog by virtue of her complicity in the trivial-
ization of reasonable suspicion stops,"l 5 it is only fair to point out that
she was no push-over for arguments that reasonable suspicion existed.116
Warrants
In State v. Erickson 117 Justice Levine's opinion for the Court took
seriously the requirement of particularity in warrants, not only in the
issuance but also in the execution. Police executed a valid warrant based
on probable cause to search defendant's duplex."l 8 The affiant's failure
to mention that defendant lived in a duplex was impliedly found by the
trial court not to constitute intentional or reckless falsity and that implicit
finding was not clearly erroneous. 1 9 The warrant described the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity by stating the address correctly
as defendant's, 503 10th Street West.120 But because the evidence was
found in a basement room under the adjacent duplex, 501 10th Street
West, which the officers entered through a closed but unlocked door, the
search exceeded the scope authorized by the warrant.121
the legislative rule of section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code.
115. Justice Levine came close to a pretext approach in a recent traffic stop case, State v. Glaes-
man, 545 N.W.2d 178 (N.D. 1996). In Glaesman, a sheriff received a call from the state's attorney,
Id. at 179, (who coincidentally was representing a deputy sheriff in small claims court against a suit by
the defendant, Id. at 183 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting)), telling him that a pickup being
driven by defendant was stuck in the snow in a parking lot, Id. at 179. The state's attorney didn't
identify himself and said nothing about defendant's physical condition. Id. The sheriff investigated.
told the driver of a second vehicle who had apparently tried to free the pickup that he would take care
of the situation, and then saw defendant sitting in the driver's seat. Id. at 180. After the door was
opened, the odor of alcohol led to an actual physical control arrest. Id. Defendant's subsequent
unruly behavior, including pushing the police chief and slapping and threatening to kill the sheriff, lead
to a disorderly conduct charge! Id.
The district court found a lack of articulable suspicion for the stop, ordered the evidence found
thereafter suppressed, and dismissed both charges. Id. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court
refused to consider the State's "community caretaker" argument because it wasn't argued to the
district court, Id. at 181, but found that no evidence in the record supported the trial court's finding that
the sheriff opened the door of the pickup, Id. at 182. Instead, the only testimony, by the sheriff, was
that as the sheriff reached to open the door, defendant opened it first. Id. Thus, the Court found there
was no stop before the sheriff smelled alcohol and reversed. Id.
Justice Levine joined with Justice Meschke's concurrence and dissent. Id. at 183-84 (Meschke,
J., concurring and dissenting). Although the focus of the disagreement in Glaesman was support for or
deference to the trial judge's determination against the existence of reasonable suspicion, it came
close to finding the action was, or could have been, pretextual. Id. at 183. It's too bad that they didn't
realize that the big problem is that the reasonable suspicion test makes little sense in minor traffic
cases, much less in non-criminal cases.
116. See, e.g., State v. Robertsdahl, 512 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1994) (concluding that information
raising deputy's curiosity regarding defendant's activity was not sufficient to raise a reasonable or
articulable suspicion justifying a stop).
117. 496 N.W.2d 555 (N.D. 1993).
118. State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555, 559 (N.D. 1993).
119. Id. at 559-60.
120. Id. at 560.
121. Id. at 560-61.
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Justice Levine showed her Fourth Amendment prescience in State v.
Sakellson,122 where her opinion for the Court first held that failure of
enforcement officers to announce their authority and purpose while
entering an open door to a house constituted a breaking under North
Dakota law.123 Anticipating the holding by the United States Supreme
Court 10 years later in Wilson v. Arkansas,124 the Court rejected the
state's argument that the violation was merely statutory and thus an ex-
clusionary remedy was excessive. 125 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held instead that the rule of announcement is more than merely statu-
tory; it is a constitutional imperative implicit in the Fourth Amendment
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is required by
Article 1, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. 126
Five officers were executing a standard (not a "no knock") search
warrant when they entered the enclosed porch to defendant's resi-
dence.127 They entered the porch through a closed but unlocked storm
door. 128 They crossed the porch to the main door of the residence,
which was open.129 They passed through the open main door without
ringing the doorbell to the side of the door, walked through a carpeted
vestibule, and climbed the stairway which led to the defendant's second
floor flat. 130 At the top of the stairs they proceeded down a short
hallway which led to the kitchen and living room doors, both of which
were open.131 Upon reaching the living room door, they looked in and
observed defendant wife seated and talking on the telephone, at which
point one officer testified that he knocked twice at the entrance of the
living room, showed his badge, and announced that he had a search
warrant. 132
The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the suppression of the
evidence by the trial court for failure to comply with the knock and
announce requirements of section 29-29-08 of the North Dakota Centu-
ry Code.133 The Court rejected the state's arguments that the vestibule
and stairway were common areas open to the public, and that entry
through the open door substantially complied with the policies underly-
ing section 29-29-08.134 Because of the need, normally, to know who is
122. 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985).
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1991).
124. 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
125. State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779,784 (N.D. 1985).
126. Id. at 784-85.






133. Id. at 785.
134. Id. at 782.
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entering and why, even when the door is open, and because of the need
to minimize violence which might be produced by a surprise entry, the
Court held that a breaking under the statute includes, ordinarily, any
entry made without permission.135
The Exclusionary Rule
As far back as 1985, in State v. Thompson,136 Justice Levine argued
against adoption of the United States Supreme Court's good faith excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule created the year before,
in United States v. Leon.137 In State v. Lewis, 138 ten years after Thomp-
son, the Court again declined to decide whether North Dakota has a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, claiming that even if
adopted, it would require reliance by the officer to be "objectively
reasonable" and the "implication of criminal activity in th[e] case [at
hand was] simply too weak and tenuous to make it objectively reason-
able for the officers to rely on the warrant." 139 Certainly prosecutors
and law enforcement officials might question the exceptional vigor of
this opinion, and even a criminal procedure teacher like me could easily
have written an opinion reaching an opposite result in this case. But Jus-
tice Levine's somewhat harsh description of the officer's unreasonable-
ness in believing he had probable cause, even after the issuing magistrate
had ratified his belief by issuing the warrant, might signal her agreement
with the Leon dissenters' concern about the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule as a gloss on the Illinois v. Gates 140 totality of circum-
stances approach to probable cause.141 The Leon dissenters wrote:
Given such a relaxed standard, it is virtually inconceivable that
a reviewing court, when faced with a defendant's motion to
suppress, could first find that a warrant was invalid under the
new Gates standard, but then, at the same time, find that a
police officer's reliance on such an invalid warrant was never-
theless "objectively reasonable" under the test announced
today. Because the two standards overlap so completely, it is
unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid under Gates and
yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively
reasonable; otherwise, we could have to entertain the mind-
135. Id.
136. 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985).
137. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
138. 527 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1995).
139. State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658, 663 (N.D. 1995).
140. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
141. Compare Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658 with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 958-59 (1984)
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
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boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an
objectively unreasonable warrant. 142
Professor LaFave adds his endorsement of this view: 14
3
There is some force to this argument. "If, as the Gates majori-
ty beguiles, probable cause is nothing more than a matter of
'practical, common sense' decision making, then it would seem
that a probable cause determination which is erroneous and
thus lacking this sagaciousness is undeserving of either the
appellation 'good faith' or the sympathetic reception which a
'good faith' qualification would allow." Moreover, to try to
pile the Leon standard on top of the Gates test, whereunder a
warrant is to be upheld upon review if there was a "substantial
basis" for a "fair probability" (or, "substantial chance") that
criminal activity exists or that evidence of crime would be
found, would seem a form of incomprehensible double count-
ing. "To say that evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
should be admissible even though the police lacked a 'substan-
tial basis' for a 'substantial chance' of criminal activity as long
as they had a reasonable belief that they had a 'substantial
basis' for a 'substantial chance' would be to promulgate an
almost mind-boggling standard."
A fitting legacy to Justice Levine is the Court's continued avoidance
of a good faith exception to the North Dakota constitutional exclusion-
ary rule now that she is not there to mind the Court's store against such
mind-boggling standards,
Justice Levine's opinion in State v. Sakellson,144 also rejected the
State's argument that a violation committed in good faith should not
trigger the exclusionary remedy. 145 The Court found that "it was no
mere technicality that the veteran officers, aware of the availability of
no-knock warrants, well briefed on the layout of the premises, and
without belief there were exigent circumstances, entered through the
open main door without knocking or ringing the doorbell."1 46 The
officer's conduct was not objectively reasonable.147
142. Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59 (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.3(f) (2d ed. 1987) (quoting, first himself, and then
Professor Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551,
589 (1984)).
144. 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985).
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Fortunately for the law of search and seizure in North Dakota,
Justice Levine's judicial conduct usually was. Her reasonableness was
not confined to search and seizure law alone.
Freedom of Expression
In City of Bismarck v. Schoppert,148 Justice Levine wrote the opinion
of the Court reversing the disorderly conduct conviction of a fellow
member of the bar who called a female police officer a "fucking, bitch-
ing cop" and responded "fuck you" to a request for identification.1 49
The jury's verdict could have been based on the hurt feelings of the
officer or an accompanying volunteer police chaplain, which would be a
violation of the defendant's First Amendment freedom of speech.iSO
Justice Levine's opinion for a unanimous Court is the more impressive
for two reluctant concurrences. Then Chief Justice Erickstad agreed that
the First Amendment "may" protect the "uncouth, foul-mouthed, and
vulgar" conduct which he believed came "perilously close" to violating
the statutory duties of attorneys.151 Current Chief Justice VandeWalle
"reluctantly" concurred, despite misgivings.152
Justice Levine's willingness to protect expression was less influential
because in dissent, but nonetheless eloquent, in Svedberg v. Stamness,153
more popularly referred to as the Dumbo case. 154 She wanted the Court
to narrow the disorderly conduct statute, which, as this case demonstrat-
ed, is clearly capable of expansive application.1 55 Justice Levine recog-
nized that freedom of expression includes expression that is hurtful,
offensive, and upsetting.15 6 For her, the fact that the petitioner
148. 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991).
149. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1991).
150. Id. at 812.
151. Id. at 814 (Erickstad, CJ., concurring specially).
152. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially).
153. 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).
154. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994). Svedberg v. Stamness is part of a
trend I call the civilization of criminal law, which is not meant as a complement. Criminal convictions
are intended to be difficult, because of the severe inherent stigma and consequences. Because of
frustrations with the criminal process, there is an increasing tendency to use civil procedures to
accomplish purposes traditionally accomplished by punishment of criminals through retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, e.g., civil commitment of the mentally, ill (an ever
increasing category, especially in light of expanding notions of addiction); revocation of impaired
drivers' licenses; and now, the most recent addition to North Dakota's arsenal of
label-switching-criminal-law-hurdle-avoidance-techniques, civil injunctions as in Stamness. The
interesting circularity of this device is that it is enforced by criminal penalties! None of the opinions in
Stamness recognizes the irony: disorderly conduct merits a class B misdemeanor penalty. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01. However, should one engage in the enjoined conduct, without ever being
convicted of the corresponding crime, the offense is a class A misdemeanor, earning a potential jail
penalty 12 times longer if the defendant knows of the order! See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(8):
155. Id. at 686 (Levine, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
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was hurt, offended and upset by being called "Dumbo," and
by seeing snowmen with big ears, is not the determining, or
even relevant, fact. It is how ordinary people would react.
And, if the first amendment protects "virulent ethnic and
religious epithets," and threats to "break your damn neck . . .
[if you go into racist stores]," how can it be possible that it
does not protect saying "Dumbo" and making snowmen? 157
Right to Bail
In City of Fargo v. Stutlien,158 a municipal court's "release from
custody" order establishing minimum periods of detention for all DUI
arrestees was held to be unlawful because it was not authorized by rule or
statute.159 The Court held that neither North Dakota Rule of Civil
Procedure 46 nor section 29-08-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
authorized the minimum periods of detention ordered by Fargo's
municipal court. 160 Because the order denying release was unauthorized
by state law, the Court found it unnecessary to determine defendants'
claim that the order also violated their constitutional right to release after
posting bail.1 61 Since the defendants did not show any specific frustra-
tion of their ability to obtain an independent blood alcohol content
(BAC) test or actual prejudice to their defense, the trial court's dismissal
of the charges was "speculative and premature." 162 -
Justice Levine, however, disagreed with the majority's refusal to
'affirm the dismissals.163 She opined that in this case, where the proce-
dural "defect is not delay but a wholly illegal deprivation of liberty,"
the prosecution should be required
to establish lack of active prejudice by proving that the defen-
dants did not ask for independent tests and appeared to be
falling-down drunk so that witnesses to their respective appear-
ance would have been of no assistance to their defense. Then,
and only then, should the defendants be obliged to refute such
evidence and place the issue of actual prejudice in dispute for
157. Id. (citations omitted). She was clearly concerned with potential for the broad construction
of the majority to lead to possible legality principle problems in subsequent cases more in tune with the
political agenda of the disorderly conduct restraining order statute's promoters. Id. at 685-86. It is a
shame that she will not be on the Court for subsequent legality principle attacks on this statute which,
despite the laudable motives of its supporters, is a clear end run around the strictures of the criminal
law, as recognized, but not criticized, by Justice Levine in her-dissent. Id.
158. 505 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1993).
159. City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 NW.2d 738,743 (N.D. 1993).
160. Id. at 741 n.3, 743.
161. Id. at 741-42.
162. id. at 746.
163. Id. (Levine. J., concurring and dissenting).
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resolution by the judge, with the City bearing the risk of
nonpersuasion. Here, the City produced no such evidence.
That failure of production should be conclusive.164
A year later, in City of Fargo v. Thompson,165 she reaffirmed her belief:
[A] system of justice that not only condones illegal incarcera-
tions but then, adding raw insult to grievous injury, puts the
victims to their proof that their illegal incarceration did them
damage, is a system that is "broke" and in need of serious
fixing.
This case heralds an unhappy, and unprecedented, addi-
tional burden on unfortunate defendants illegally deprived of
their liberty. Not only must they prove actual prejudice while
the guilty party remains passive, they must prove it to this
court. The majority's de novo review of the facts and infer-
ences turns our customary deferential standard of review of
facts on its head. The trial judge is abler than we to weigh the
facts. That is his business and we should let him do it. In my
view, he made no clear error and so I would affirm.166
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
It's a mystery of some complexity how one squares the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt with the deferential standard applied
on appeal to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Without
entering that quagmire, I will merely mention that reversals for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence are extremely rare in North Dakota criminal
cases. In State v. Johnson,167 Justice Levine's opinion for the Court
explained that intent to deprive the owner is an element of theft in an
unauthorized control prosecution under section 12.1-23-02(1) of the
North Dakota Century Code.168 Defendant was found asleep in a stolen
pickup truck while its engine ran and its lights and left blinker were
on.169 The pickup had been reported stolen three to four hours
earlier.170 Defendant testified that he had received a ride from the pick-
up's driver, passed out, and subsequently was awakened by the driver
164. Id. at 747.
165. 520 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 1994).
166. City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 585 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., concurring and
dissenting). Her deference to trial court factfinding is discussed below at notes 284-88 and
accompanying text.
167. 425 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1988).
168. State v. Johnson, 425 N.W.2d 903,905 (N.D. 1988).
169. Id. at 904.
170. Id.
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who told him he would be right back. 17 1 Defendant then fell asleep
again, awoke and moved into the driver's seat to turn on the heater, and
fell asleep again until awakened by the arresting officer. 172 The Court
held that the evidence was insufficient to show defendant's intent to
deprive the truck's owner of the truck.173
In City of Bismarck v. Schoppert,174 discussed above as a First
Amendment free speech case, Levine's opinion also held that the City's
evidence was insufficient to show that Schoppert's vulgar and abusive
speech tended to cause an immediate breech of the peace.175
Double Jeopardy
In the area of double jeopardy law, Justice Levine concurred in the
line of opinions, starting with State v. Zimmerman, holding that criminal
prosecution for DUI following license suspension in an administrative
proceeding does not constitute double jeopardy under the federal
Constitution. 176 The fact the defendant views the outcome as punish-
ment is not controlling. The administrative suspension "serves the
remedial goal of protecting the public from impaired drivers, and the
suspension of the license is not greatly disproportionate to the remedial
goal."'177 In State v. Sinner,178 the Court had held in 1973 that the
administrative suspension was not double jeopardy because it was not a
penalty.1 79 Driving is a privilege, not a right, and revocation of a privi-
lege is not ordinarily punishment. Later, the Court distinguished United
States v. Halper180 and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 181 by finding that the suspension is not punishment because it is
remedial, that is, designed to protect the public from drunk drivers, not
to punish or deter, and whatever punitive or deterrent value the revoca-
tion has is "merely incidental."1 82 Justice Levine's about-face on the
same issue under the North Dakota Constitution is evident in her dissent-
ing opinion in State v. Jacobson.183 Justice Levine's eloquent dissent in
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 906.
174. 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991).
175. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1991).
176. State v. Jacobson, 545 N.W.2d 152, 153 (N.D. 1996); State v. Boehler, 542 N.W.2d 745, 747
(N.D. 1996); City of Dickinson v. Powell, 539 N.W.2d 869, 870 (N.D. 1996); State v. Zimmerman, 539
N.W.2d 49, 56 (N.D. 1995).
177. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 50.
178. 207 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1973).
179. State v. Sinner, 207 N.W.2d 495, 501 (N.D. 1973) (citing Thomson v. Thomson, 78 N.W.2d
395, 399 (N.D. 1956)).
180. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
181. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
182. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 55.
183. 545 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1996). Jacobson remarkably produced five opinions. Chief Justice
VandeWalle agreed with Justice Levine's
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Jacobson together with her opinion in Orr,184 discussed below, 185
constitute a primer on North Dakota state constitutional procedure.
Due Process
In State v. VanNatta,186 the Court held that the trial court's determi-
nation that defendant was competent to stand trial was not clearly errone-
ous because it was in agreement with the testimony of a psychiatrist who
examined defendant nearly a year previously.1 87 The psychiatrist's
opinion of competency was countered by a subsequent examination by a
clinical psychologist who concluded that, although defendant under-
stood the nature of the proceedings, he couldn't participate effectively in
his defense.188 Subsequently, a state hospital psychiatrist agreed with the
first psychiatrist, while defendant's counsel and a criminal lawyer
appointed by the trial court to examine the defendant agreed with the
psychologist that defendant was unable to assist in providing an adequate
defense.189 The ratio of three (one clinical psychologist and two defense
lawyers) to two (psychiatrists) was not enough to render determination of
competency clearly erroneous for the Court. 190
Justice Levine's dissent took issue with the Court's deference to the
trial court under the "clearly erroneous" test. 191 She expressed discom-
fort with the timing of the psychiatrist's examinations and the disregard
of the psychologist's greater familiarity with the defendant. 192 Although
neither discomfort alone would have justified her dissent, "their cumula-
tive impact contributes to [her] firm and definite conviction that a
mistake has been made about the competency of the defendant." 193
Although the phrase "due process" does not appear in the case, Justice
Levine cites Dusky v. United States, 194 suggesting "[wihat is widely-
regarded as the constitutionally-required criteria for evaluating defen-
dants' competency."1 95 Others have noted a "universal agreement that
well-chronicled dissent to the extent that it demonstrates it is improvident to hold that a
North Dakota constitutional provision will always be construed the same as a similar
provision in the United States Constitution, or, for that matter, will always be construed
differently than a similar provision in the United States Constitution.
Id. at 153. He disagreed, however, with her conclusion that administrative sanctions are punitive for
double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 154.
184. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
185. See infra section notes 198-202 (discussing right to counsel).
186. 506 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1993).
187. State v. VanNatta, 506 . ,.W.2d 63, 63 (N.D. 1985).
188. Id. at 66-67.
189. Id. at 67.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 71-72 (Levine, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 72.
193. Id.
194. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
195. FRANK W. MILLER, ROBERT 0. DAwSON, GEORGE E. Dix, RAYMOND I. PARNAS, CRIMINAL
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it is a violation of due process" to try an incompetent defendant.196
Interestingly, neither the majority nor Justice Levine in dissent seemed to
factor in the opinion of the criminal defense lawyer appointed by the
trial court to examine the defendant. Arguably an experienced defense
lawyer, not connected with the case, should be a highly competent
evaluator of a defendant's ability to assist in his defense. Unfortunately,
the VanNatta opinions offer no guidance to trial courts about the
appropriateness or usefulness of such an innovative appointment and
examination in the future.
The Right to Counsel
In State v. Orr,197 Justice Levine wrote an opinion interpreting
Article I, Section 12, of the North Dakota Constitution as granting a
broader right to prevent punishment enhancement based on uncounseled
prior convictions than that provided under the federal Constitution. 198
Orr is discussed elsewhere in this issue as an opinion identified by its
author as significant.199
In addition to her significant contributions to the right to counsel as
a matter of state constitutional law, Justice Levine authored an opinion,
State v. Skjonsby, 200 discussing one of the thorniest questions at the
intersection of the constitutional right to effective counsel and the ethical
obligations of a criminal defense lawyer with a lying client. This opin-
ion was recognized as significant by the Ethics Advisory Committee of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in an ethics
advisory opinion which
adopts the dominant view that the lawyer should not act on the
belief that a client intends to commit perjury unless the lawyer
has "actual knowledge" that the testimony will be false or, at
least, knows this to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the lawyer's
judgment that there is a reasonable doubt should be accepted
as falling within the "wide range of reasonable professional
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 764 (4th ed. 1991).
196. Id.
197. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
198. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
199. See Ralph J. Erickstad & Michael J. Hagburg, In Justice Beryl Levine's View: Her Most
Significant Opinions, 72 N.D. L. REV. 915 (1997). Orr was followed by State v. Cummings, 386
N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986), another Levine opinion.
200. 417 N.w.2d 818 (N.D. 1987).
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assistance." See, e.g., State v. Skjonsby, 417 N.W.2d 818 (No.
Dak. 1987).201
The Principle of Legality
The legality principle is actually an umbrella term for a number of
legal doctrines. Professor Paul Robinson explains:
In addition to its unique focus upon moral blameworthi-
ness, ... criminal law is unique in its adherence to what is
called the "legality principle." . . . In its original latin dress,
it was stated as "nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine
lege," meaning roughly: no crime without law, nor punish-
ment without law. In its modem form it means that criminal lia-
bility and punishment can be based only upon a prior legis-
lative enactment of a prohibition expressed with adequate
precision and clarity. The principle is not a legal rule but
rather a concept embodied in a series of legal rules and doc-
trines. In addition to the nearly universal modem prohibition
against judicial creation of new offenses and the strong trend
toward abolition of common law offenses (offenses defined in
a case rather than in a statute), the legality principle is ex-
pressed in the constitutional prohibition against vague statutes,
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, and the
rule requiring strict construction of penal statutes. 202
The legality principle rubric arguably constitutes a basic component of
due process or fundamental fairness and demonstrates a commitment on
the part of our criminal justice system to fair play. The work of Justice
Levine shows her own personal judicial leadership in giving the abstract
principles of legality concrete application in North Dakota.
Strict construction
In State v. Pollack,20 3 the Court determined that a driver who
escaped on foot after being removed from his vehicle could be convicted
under section 39-10-71 of the North Dakota Century Code for
fleeing.204 The statute provides, in relevant part:
201. Ethics Advisory Committee, Formal Opinion 92-2, CHAMPION, Mar. 1993, at 23 (citing and
quoting State v. Skjonsby, 417 N.W.2d 818, 828 (N.D. 1987)). I am grateful to Bruce Quick, a
practitioner from Fargo, North Dakota, with whom I teach a course in criminal advocacy, for calling
this opinion to my attention.
202. PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTAlS OF CRIMINAL LAW 117 (2d ed. 1995).
203. 462 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1990).
204. State v. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D. 1990).
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Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses
to bring the vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts
to elude, in any manner, a pursuing police vehicle or peace
officer, when given a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 205
Justice Levine's dissent succinctly stated and applied the doctrine of
strict construction. 206 Her opinion, in its economical entirety:
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the
defendant and against the Government. An obvious purpose
of Section 39-10-71 N.D.C.C. is to discourage car chases. The
statute says that any driver who does not stop his vehicle or
who otherwise flees or tries to elude, "in any manner", a peace
officer, when told to bring the vehicle to a stop, is guilty of a
Class A Misdemeanor. Defendant here did bring his vehicle to
a stop when told to do so and thus did not violate this statute.
When we construe a criminal statute, we should hold the
legislature to mean what it says, not what it meant to say but
didn't. Indeed, even if another construction were reasonable,
the benefit of doubt should insure to the defendant. I would
reverse .207
In State v. Pippin F08 the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of
stolen property found in her house. 209 Her former husband pled guilty
to the burglaries during which the property was stolen. 210 Justice
Levine's opinion for the Court held that restitution under section 12.1-
32-08(a) of the North Dakota Century Code is limited to damages
"directly related" to the criminal offense. 211 The Court reversed
defendant's restitution order because it ordered restitution for damages
without "an immediate and intimate causal connection between the
[defendant's] criminal conduct and the damages." 212 She could not be
ordered to pay restitution for damages to the burglarized homes or for
unrecovered property, but could be ordered to pay for damage to
property returned or resulting from its temporary loss. 213
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-71 (1996). The statute has been subsequently amended to provide
that third and subsequent offenses are class C felonies. Id.
206. Pollack, 462 N.W.2d at 122 (Levine, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. 496 N.W.2d 50 (1993).
209. State v. Pippin, 496 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1993).
210. Id. at 53.
211. Id. at 52.
212. Id. at 53.
213. Id.
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In another case, State v. Monson,214 Justice Levine wrote an opinion
finding that a gross sexual imposition probationer who attended six of
his victim's college basketball games did not violate his probation
condition that he "shall have no contact with the victim." 2 15 Prohibited
contact includes "personal contact, as well as telephonic and mail
communications." 216 Probation conditions, too, are strictly construed in
the defendant's favor.2 17 The victim testified that she had no eye contact
or communication with the defendant during the games. 2 18 His pres-
ence, even. though intended to intimidate, was not enough to constitute
contact, as strictly construed. 219
In yet another case, State v. Grenz,220 Justice Levine dissented from
a ruling that a person whose driving privileges were suspended for fail-
ure to provide proof of financial responsibility under Chapter 39-16.1,
of the North Dakota Century Code, may be convicted for driving under
Suspension in violation of section 39-06-42(1) despite its language
reading: "Except as provided in chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1 . . . any
person who drives . . . while that person's license or privilege so to do is
suspended or revoked is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 22 1 She
reminded the court that the "benefit of any doubt in the meaning of a
criminal statute should inure to a favorable construction for the defen-
dant, not the State." 222 For good measure, she then chastised the Court
for its result orientation:
I am puzzled by the majority's apparent concern that reversing
the conviction would let Grenz go scot-free because of double
jeopardy. I am unaware of any precedent that says we construe
a statute so as to ensure affirmance of a conviction. I really do
not believe that the majority suggests that a construction which
reverses a conviction is a ludicrous or absurd result. Whether
or not double jeopardy prevents retrial is irrelevant. 223
It is precisely that lesson that I believe Justice Levine brought to the
Court and which her departure may allow the Court to begin to forget.
But that, should it happen, will be the occasion for a future review.
214. 518 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1994).
215. State v. Monson, 518 N.W.2d 171. 174 (N.D. 1994).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 173 (citing State v. Droder, 432 N.W.2d 553, 554 (N.D. 1988)).
218. Id. at 174.
219. Id.
220. 437 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1989).
221. State v. Grenz, 437 N.W.2d 851, 852 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 855.
223. Id.
996 [VOL. 72:967
JUSTICE BERYL LEVINE: CRIMINAL CASES
Prohibition of ex post facto laws no bar to application of
ameliorating statutes to defendants
Justice Levine understood that the principle of legality is a shield to
protect defendants from the State, and thus should not be applied with
strict consistency as a sword against defendants. In State v. Cum-
mings,224 where the DUI penalty had been amended from 15 days to 4
days imprisonment after defendant's offense, and he pleaded guilty after
the effective date, Justice Levine's opinion determined that the decreased
amended penalty was appropriate.225 Cummings overruled State v. Kauf-
man,226 and held that the general rule against retroactive application of
amended statutes no longer applies to ameliorating amendments to penal
statutes. 227 From now on, unless otherwise indicated by the legislature,
an ameliorating amendment to a criminal statute will be seen as reflect-
ing a legislative determination that the lesser punishment is appropriate
for the offense. 228 Where a conviction is not final prior to the effective
date of the amendment, the lower penalty is applicable.
229
The void for vagueness doctrine
The only opinion by Justice Levine that I could find discussing the
void for vagueness doctrine is State v. Beyer.230 Justice Levine's opinion
for the Court determined that the language of section 39-21-37 of the
North Dakota Century Code requiring effective vehicle mufflers "to
prevent excessive or unusual noise" was not unconstitutionally vague.
231
She succinctly summarized the requirements of the doctrine:
The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions re-
quire definiteness of criminal statues so that the language, when
measured by common understanding and practice, gives ade-
quate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries
sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to fairly administer
the law. In order to survive a vagueness challenge, a statute
must meet two requirements: (1) it must provide adequate
warning as to the conduct proscribed, and (2) it must establish
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement. 232
224. 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986).
225. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468,472 (N.D. 1986).
226. 310 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1981).
227. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 471.
228. Id. at 472.
229. Id.
230. 441 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1989).
231. State v. Beyer, 441 N.W.2d 919, 922 (N.D. 1989).
232. Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
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Unfortunately, her opinion fails to mention that the loud muffler
statute is not a criminal statute, but rather a non-criminal or so-called
administrative offense. A realistic perspective on the vagueness doctrine
would recognize that all legislation, indeed all language, is in some sense
or to some degree vague or inexact, and that as a practical matter, the
rule against vagueness is really a rule against excessive vagueness. Just
as the amount of muffled noise that is excessive or unusual might differ
for a Mack Truck engine and a moped, the amount of vagueness tolera-
ble in a statute might differ between one imposing the death penalty and
one, like the muffler statute, imposing a fine. Thus, I have no quarrel
with the result reached in Justice Levine's opinion in Beyer. I do have a
quarrel with her failure to observe its non-criminal nature and, as dis-
cussed above, her complicity, repeated and emphasized in Beyer, with the
Court's application of the reasonable suspicion standard to investigative
stops for such offenses.
Other rights
Justice Levine, in two cases, provided the basis for a theory as to
when violation of a statutory right will result in exclusion of evidence
found as a result. 233 State v. Sakellson234 was discussed above in the
context of Justice Levine's anticipation of the United State's Supreme
Court decision that the statutory knock and announce requirement is in
fact an aspect of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 235 From Sakelison,
one can infer that violations of statutes, such as the knock and announce
requirement of North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08, which are
implicit in the Fourth Amendment or-which embody very important
legislative policies, require exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of
their violation.236
In contrast, in State v. Runck,237 leaving an unsigned and undated
copy of a search warrant at the scene of the search in violation of Rule
41 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure did not evidence
deliberate institutional disregard requiring judicial protection of the
integrity of the system. 238 Absent prejudice to the defendant or a
showing of intentional disregard of the rule or of the Fourth Amend-
233. See State v. Runck, 534 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1996); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D.
1985).
234. 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985).
235. See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
236. However, one should also be aware of the fact that in Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914
(1995), the United States Supreme Court did not rule on the prosecution's independent source and
inevitable discovery arguments for not applying the exclusionary remedy to violations of the knock
and announce requirement.
237. 534 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1996).
238. State v. Runck, 534 N.W.2d 829, 832 (N.D. 1996).
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ment, the "ministerial" violation of Rule 41 didn't warrant suppres-
sion.239 Thus, in light of Justice Levine's opinions, we can deduce a test
for application of a non-constitutional statutory exclusionary rule:
Under Sakkelson, statutes which further the policies of the constitution
will result in exclusion, whereas under Runck, less important violations of
judicial rules of procedure and statutes, especially absent a showing of
harm to the defendant, will not.
Statutory limits on prosecution appeals
Justice Levine took seriously statutory limits on the state's right to
appeal. In City of Fargo v. Cossette,240 her opinion for the Court found
no jurisdiction under section 29-28-07 of the North Dakota Century
Code for the city to appeal a trial court's exclusion of (1) blood test
results because the blood test kit was a device and thus should have been,
but wasn't, approved and certified by the State Toxicologist, and (2) a
prior conviction because of an Orr241 violation. 242 Neither action by the
trial court constituted a suppression of evidence "on the ground that it
was illegally obtained" as required under the appeal statute and North
Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3).243
Similarly, but somewhat surprisingly, in State v. Schindele,244 a
suppression order was held not appealable by the state under section
29-28-07 of the North Dakota Century Code because the suppressed
evidence was not "substantial proof of a fact material in the proceed-
ing." 245 The defendant was taken into custody for detoxification by a
police officer investigating a domestic disturbance, and subsequently
charged with assault upon his wife. 246 The district court found the deten-
tion unlawful under section 5-01-05.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code.247 While rejecting the defendant's motion for dismissal as an inap-
propriate remedy, the district court suppressed evidence about the defen-
dant's drinking, intoxication, and incarceration, clarified subsequently as
barring "any testimony from anyone about Michael's [the defendant's]
239. Id.
240. 512 N.w.2d 459 (N.D. 1994).
241. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
242. City of Fargo v. Cossette, 512 N.W.2d 459,460 (N.D. 1994).
243. Id. Contrast State v. Keyes, 536 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1995), where a trial court order
excluding two prior convictions from consideration, essentially reducing a DUI charge from a class A
to a class B misdemeanor, in effect quashed the class A charge and thus was appealable under section
29-28-07(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.
244. 540 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1995).
245. State v. Schindele, 540 N.W.2d 139, 142 (N.D. 1995).
246. Id. at 140.
247. Id.
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twenty-four-hour confinement and any testimony from Harrington [the
investigating officer] about Michael's 'state of sobriety."' 248
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the state's appeal, find-
ing the suppressed evidence was not "substantial proof of a fact material
in the proceeding." 249 Justice Levine's opinion held that this evidence
was substantially less probative than, for example, a confession.2 50 She
rejected the state's claim that the evidence of intoxication is relevant to
the dispute between the parties and to the defendant's conduct leading
up to the simple assault charge. 251 Despite statements that the prosecu-
tor's statement is to be given "utmost deference," and the definition of
substantial proof of a fact material as "evidence that would significantly
assist the factfinder's evaluation of a fact relevant to the outcome of the
case," the Court held that intoxication is not an element of simple assault
and thus is irrelevant to its commission and "unlikely" to be a "fact
relevant to the outcome of the case," 252 Moreover, the Court rejected
the state's argument on appeal that proving intoxication would make it
easier to prove commission of simple assault, because, assuming it to be
true arguendo, it nonetheless "could be found by a court to be
cumulative and excludable" under North Dakota Rule of Evidence
403.253 "Cumulative testimony is by definition testimony that would
not make a significant contribution to proof of a fact." 254 Thus, the
State's conclusion that the evidence of intoxication was substantial proof
of a material fact was "without foundation in reason or logic," and thus
the suppression order was not appealable. 255
A trial court's sound discretion is not unlimited
Prior to Justice Levine's tenure on the Court, it seemed nearly
impossible for a trial court in a criminal case to abuse its discretion, at
least when ruling in favor of the prosecution. Justice Levine wrote a
number of opinions indicating that application of the "abuse of discre-
tion" standard did not signal an automatic prosecution victory on
appeal.
For example, in State v. Klein,256 the defendant was improperly
deprived of his right to a public trial when the trial court granted the
State's mid-trial motion to exclude the public without a hearing and
248. Id. at 141.
249. Id. at 142.
250. Id. at 141.
251. Id. at 142.
252. Id. at 141-42.
253. Id. at 142.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989)
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findings.257 Exclusion of the public absolutely requires that the trial
court articulate its reasons on the record and express them in findings
that enable a proper appellate review. 258 Moreover, a motion to close
must ordinarily be made before trial.259
In State v. Gates ,260 Justice Levine wrote that waiver of a jury trial is
effective only when expressed "in writing or in open court," and cannot
be inferred or presumed. 26 1 The trial court's conclusion that it could
find defendant to have impliedly waived a jury trial was a misinterpreta-
tion of law and thus an abuse of discretion.262
Perhaps the least likely reason for a trial court to be reversed on
appeal is a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. However, in one area
of evidence law, I believe majority rulings resulted from Justice Levine's
earlier dissenting groundwork. 263 In State v. Bohe,264 the Court held that
defendant's nine prior burglary convictions were admissible to impeach
him and that admission of inadmissible prior misdemeanor theft convic-
tions was harmless error.265 Justice Levine's dissent noted that:
In admitting the nine prior burglary convictions, the trial
court not only gave no reasons, it gave no hint of an explana-
tion. The majority is simply too gentle when it observes that
the trial court was "not as explicit as it could have been [in]
identifying and weighing the relevant factors . . . ." Not only
was the trial court not explicit, it was downright cryptic.
It is obvious that the only reason for seeking admission of
nine prior burglary convictions is to make clear to a jury that a
defendant is an unmitigated scoundrel who did it, and did it,
and did it before, and obviously did it again. I have little doubt
that the evidence achieved its intended purpose. My only
question is: Why bother with the presentation of any other
evidence? Nine priors should be more than sufficient to nail a
defendant.266
She pointed out that similar criminal convictions are inherently
prejudicial, unfair, and require a compelling reason other than to show
defendant's bad character, a reason "that outweighs the obvious
257. State v. Klen, 438 N.W.2d 798, 800 (N.D. 1989).
258. Id. at 801.
259. Id. at 800.
260. 496 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1993).
261. State v. Gates, 496 N.W.2d 553, 554-55 (N.D. 1993) (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 23).
262. Id. at 555.
263. See e.g., State v. Bohe, 447 N.W.2d 277, 282-83 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
264. 447 N.W.2d 277 (N.D. 1989).
265. State v. Bohe, 447 N.W.2d 277, 282 (N.D. 1989).
266. Id. at 282-83 (Levine, J.. dissenting).
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prejudice." 267 Justice Levine referred to Judge Weinstein's suggestion
that same crime impeachment be limited to one prior conviction and
then only for strong reasons and direct relation to veracity. 268 Since the
Court had previously approved admission of two same crime priors,
Justice Levine would have drawn the line there, at two. 269 For Justice
Levine: "Every defendant, even one with nine prior convictions, enjoys
the presumption of innocence. A defendant should not be compelled to
choose between taking the stand and having his record of nine prior
convictions admitted." 270
In 1995, her remonstrations bore fruit. In State v. Eugene,271 the
Court ruled that North Dakota Rule of Evidence 609(a)(ii) requires that
a prior conviction being used to impeach the accused must bear directly
on the propensity to testify truthfully.272 Justice Neumann's careful
opinion first determined that possession of an imitation controlled
substance does not fit because belief that the substance actually is a
controlled substance is no defense, that is, knowledge that the substance
is an imitation is not an element. 273 Thus, where, as in Eugene, the
record provides no information about the underlying circumstances of
the conviction, it cannot be determined whether the conduct involved in
the prior involved false statement or dishonesty. 274
Furthermore, admissibility of convictions for possession of an imita-
tion controlled substance with intent to deliver and escape were not
properly admitted under Rule 609(a)(i) because the record failed to
show "that the trial court meaningfully or appropriately considered the
relevant factors in balancing the probative value of Eugene's prior con-
victions to impeach his testimony against their prejudicial effect on the
jury in reaching its verdict." 275 The trial court's statements explained
little, and what was explained suggested inappropriate consideration and
weighing. 276 It unduly emphasized the similar, crime factor, without con-
sidering the "heightened danger the jury will use the evidence not only
for impeachment purposes, but also substantively." 277
Thus Justice Levine's approach to prior convictions finally became
that of the Court's majority.278 However, the majority also found that
267. Id. at 283.
268. Id. (citing 3 WEINSTmIN's EVIDENCE 609-68 (1989)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 536 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1995).
272. State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692,694 (N.D. 1995).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 694-95.
275. Id.
276. Id.
,277. Id. at 695-96.
278. See id. at 696 (holding that that trial court failed to provide an explanation adequate for the
North Dakota Supreme Court to conclude it appropriately exercised its discretion in admitting thb prior
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the error was harmless because it was not convinced that the admission of
the priors affected the verdict.279 The harmless error ruling caused
Justice Levine to dissent once again.280 She observed that: "The very
reason prior convictions are so carefully segregated and regulated by
our Rules of Evidence is that they are intrinsically prejudicial. It is a
basic principle of evidence law that the bad character of a 'defendant
cannot be used to prove present guilt." 28 1 With her characteristic
sharpness of intellect and word, she quipped that "we exclude evidence
of prior convictions because their prejudice often outweighs any proba-
tive value. If that is so, how can their erroneous admission, that is in a
situation where their prejudice outweighs their probative value, be
harmless, that is, non prejudicial?" 282
SHE TOOK SERIOUSLY DEFERENCE TO TRIAL COURT FINDINGS
As a very part-time municipal court judge, I miss her in ways that
full time trial courts should appreciate even more than I. Although she
kept the judges on their toes as to the law, she also took seriously the
other side of that coin, namely, deference to fact (or factual aspects of
mixed law-fact) finding by trial courts. 283  Such deference to trial
courts' orders suppressing confessions as involuntary was evident in
State v. Taillon, 284 and State v. Pickar.285 Similarly, in State v.
Huether,286 the Court affirmed a trial court's order suppressing the
results of a search for exceeding the scope of the defendant's consent. 287
convictions for impeachment).
279. Id.
280. Id. (Levine, J., dissenting).
'281. Id. at 697 (Levine, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 698. In State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435,438 (N.D. 1995), the Court held that pri-
or convictions for felony terrorizing and felony aggravated assault were erroneously, but harmlessly,
admitted under North Dakota Rule of Evidence 609(a) at defendant's trial for selling five joints. As in
Eugene, the trial court failed to adequately explain on the record how it balanced the factors
(probative value and prejudicial effect), but the North Dakota Supreme Court, with Justice Meschke
writing the opinion, found the admission of the priors here even less harmful than the harmless error in
Eugene. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d at 443. Justice Levine concurred with this finding of harmless error,
but only because the defendant raised an entrapment defense. Id. (Levine, J., concurring). "When a
defendant claims entrapment in a jurisdiction applying a subjective entrapment test, the government
may rebut this defense with prior conviction evidence relevant to the defendant's predisposition to
commit the offense. id. She cited seven federal cases and one treatise for that proposition, but did not
explain how the priors in Murchison, for felony terrorizing and felony aggravated assault, were
relevant to a predisposition to sell five joints. Id.
283. See, e.g., State v. Zink, 519 N.W.2d 581, 584 (N.D. 1994) (affirming the trial court's
suppression of a blood alcohol content (BAC) test result under section 39-20-07(9) of the North
Dakota Century Code because of chemist's unavailability for which the State was at least negligent
and thus partially responsible).
284. 470 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1996).
285. 453 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1990).
286. 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990).
287. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 783 (N.D. 1990).
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JUSTICE LEVINE WAS A GREAT STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
Thus far, I have indicated a variety of specific examples of Justice
Levine's significant opinions in criminal appeals. But what is it about
her work in these cases that justifies this tribute essay and the law review
issue prompting it? Some might claim that opinions reaching proper
results are the mark of a great justice. But what is a proper result?
Thousands of volumes of jurisprudence have failed to resolve that
question. Moreover, nearly everyone who thinks seriously about what
makes good appellate judges agrees it is not only the results for which
they vote. In other words, most thoughtful citizens, and certainly law-
yers, would agree that a judge might write poor opinions in cases reach-
ing correct results, however they define correct, and vice versa.
In other words, although results are of course important, certainly of
most importance to the general public, it is common to separate the
opinion from the result. Professor James Boyd White, in his marvelous
book Justice as Translation, points out that:
It is, after all, to a large degree in the opinion, not the decision,
that the great judge manifests her greatness: anyone can vote
her intuitions or biases or feelings-for or against the plaintiff,
the poor, the rich, the government-and in the nature of things
all our decisions of that kind are ultimately mysterious, even to
ourselves. The great contribution of the judicial mind is not
the vote but the judicial opinion, which gives meaning to the
vote. . . Of course results matter too; but most cases that
reach the Supreme Court, at least, are hard-decent and intelli-
gent people could vote either way and in fact have usually
done so-and in an important sense what distinguishes the
work of a good judge is not the vote but the achievement of
mind, essentially literary in character, by which the results are
given meaning in the context of the rest of law, the rest of
life.288
Professor White describes the common feeling of lawyers that there
is "often something to admire in an opinion with the result of which we
disagree (in the simple sense that we would have voted the other way)
and often something to deplore in opinions that 'come out' the way we
would vote if we had the responsibility of judging." 289 Unfortunately,
we have no particularly satisfactory language for describing the basis for
our admiration. Indeed "[iut may be surprising to suggest that those of
us who are lawyers, at least, do not know how to criticize judicial opin-
288. JAMES BOYD WHr, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 91-92 (1990).
289. Id. at 93.
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ions. well, for in law school, both as students and as teachers, we seem to
do little else. The judicial opinion is the core of a legal education." 290
But it is very difficult to articulate, much less agree upon, the basis for
our judicial criticism.
What is it, then, about the a judge's votes and opinions that justifies
the label great? Perhaps the composite of evaluations in this tribute issue
provide sufficient basis for its professional readers to draw their own
conclusions. My description of her work provides a wide canvass of my
personal reasons for regretting Justice Levine's departure from our
Court.
One problem, however, with views like White's that de-emphasize
results as the mark of a great appellate judge, is that they leave evaluation
primarily to the insiders, the judges and lawyers who read judicial
opinions and law reviews. For example, another heavy hitter jurisprude,
Ronald Dworkin, conceives of an idealized judge named Hercules who,
in paraphrase of his early book's title, takes rights seriously. 291 Dworkin
postulates "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acu-
men" whom he calls Hercules. 292 Of course the key word here is
"superhuman" and thus the mythic and godlike appellation. I assume
that Justice Levine is the closest we will find in this worldly realm (North
Dakota's corner, at least) and that it is praise enough to describe her as a
lawyer of uncommon skill, learning, and acumen. 293
Dworkin's Hercules decides issues of constitutional law, statutory
interpretation, and common law (judge made law) on the basis of princi-
ples derived from a grand scheme of law supported by political philoso-
phy and institutional detail.294 In my view, the closest we have come in
North Dakota in my time here to a supreme court justice who self-
consciously searches for underlying principles arid then articulates them
as bases for her judicial opinions, a truly Herculean task, is our first
woman on the Court, Justice Levine. In North Dakota jurisprudence, the
wisdom of Athena supplants the strength of Hercules.
But I am troubled by a view of judging that relies entirely on the
philosophical sensibilities of the elite professional few or the even fewer
of -that number who read treatises such as Dworkin's or White's. I would
like to believe that a good justice should also be appreciated by the
general populace of North Dakota, at least if they were aware of her
290. Id.
291. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
292. Id. at 105.
293. Id. After seeing her in action several times during oral argument, talking wiih lawyers who
have undergone that process, and reading her opinions in City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739
(N.D. 1993), and Vitko v. Vitko, 524 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., concurring), I will leave it
for others to judge the extent of her patience.
294. DWORKIN, supra note 291, at 107.
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work. Newspaper columnist Mike Royko describes conversations with
his old friend, Slats Grobnik, for the view of the person on the street. 295
I am not sure whether Slats is real or only Royko's rhetorical device for
giving us his supposed common viewpoint. While writing this essay, I
did indeed consult a lunch companion, my own version of Slats. I'll call
him Coach, since that's what he is. Coach has a college degree in his-
tory, and does not appear to have ever read a court opinion of any kind.
When I asked Coach what he thought makes a state supreme court
justice great, he first replied that he had never thought about it, but
considered it an interesting question. After a moment's reflection, he
came up with qualities such as good character and a penchant for hard
and long work. I told him that those would be hard to argue with and I
would assume Justice Levine is of good character and works hard, but
that I would have to rely for my essay on qualities demonstrated by the
judge's written opinions. He then said that he thought the most impor-
tant characteristic for a good justice would be the ability to see others'
points of view and understand their situations. In Coach's word, a justice
should demonstrate empathy. Coach's intuitive lunch time theory seems
to me consistent and somewhat resonant with Professor White's sugges-
tion that one virtue of good judicial writing is what he calls its
openness .296
A common view of the judicial opinion is that it is a kind of
brief, a mobilization of all the arguments that can colorably be
made on behalf of the result chosen, with somewhat less
superficial acknowledgment of what can be said on the other
side than one finds in a lawyer's brief. But it might be
thought that the task of the judge in writing an opinion is to
expose to the reader the grounds upon which her judgment
actually rests, with as full and fair a statement of her doubts and
uncertainties as she can manage. 297
White admits that no United States Supreme Court Justice has
"consistently written out of such an understanding; Harlan comes
closest, but one can see instances of such authenticity of mind in the
work of others as well, including Holmes, Jackson, Black, and
Douglas." 298 In North Dakota, I rank Justice Levine as closest to such
federal greats. Justice Levine's experience of life and other people; her
growth and change; her process of reciprocal interaction with people,
295. See, for the most relevant example I could find, Slats's opinion on David Souter's nomina-
tion by President Bush to the United States Supreme Court. Mike Royko, Souter's Normal, and That's
Scary, CHI. TRhI., July 31, 1990, at 3.
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language, and nature; all these were uniquely reflected in her judicial
writing. White's felicitous synthesis of the arts of translation, integration,
and judging helps me to better understand both my own evaluation of
Justice Levine as a great judge and my own inability to articulate a
knock-down argument for a benchmark. 299
The practice of translation, and interpretation too, de-
mands an excellence, fully attainable by no one, that is ethical
as well as intellectual in character: that one be a certain sort of
person, with a certain attitude, ready to act out of fidelity to the
text in constantly new contexts; it calls for art and invention,
for a quality of consciousness that can be heard in the voice;
and in doing so it defines a set of opportunities for us as both
lawyers and as people.
In the law, the practical effect of such a consciousness, if
we could attain it, would be the perpetual erosion of the force
and authority of the merely bureaucratic, for the central vice of
bureaucratic language-by which I mean the language of
planning and the language of theory alike-is that it has no
way to admit the value of any other way of talking, any other
way of being. The translator, or the translator-lawyer, would
thus perpetually resist the claim of bureaucratic language, and
of its forms of life, that everything can be translated with out
loss into its terms; she would similarly challenge the formula-
tions by which the power of one person (or a group) over the
lives of another in the private sphere is justified or made to
seem natural, by languages that assert their own unquestioned
validity. It is the genius of the law to provide a place in which
unheard voices can be heard and responded to; it is our task as
lawyers to realize this possibility. 300
Excellence, both intellectual and ethical, characterizes the quality
that Justice Levine consistently demonstrated. Moreover, as the first
woman, she added a new language or voice 301 to the artistic collective we
call a court. Her language of excellence added empathy, an ear for the
previously unknown voices, to our Court's traditional artistry.
To test out my hypothesis on Coach, I described a recent case, State
v. Halton,30 2 in which Justice Levine dissented. 303 I told him a defendant
was charged with the version of gross sexual imposition that we used to
299. Id. at 267.
300. Id.
301. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (exploring the notion of psychological
differences in the way women and men deal with moral questions).
302. 535 N.W.2d 734 (N.D. 1995).
303. State v. Halton, 535 N.W.2d 734, 739 (N.D. 1995) (Levine, J., dissenting).
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call statutory rape.304 The defendant admitted having sex with the
victim, but said he thought she was older, which is no defense in this
case. 305 His defense lawyer and the prosecutor agreed that in exchange
for a guilty plea the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of eigh-
teen months with six months suspended, that is, one year to serve. 306 I
explained that judges are never bound to accept bargained for sentences,
but that when a sentence is agreed to between the defendant and the
prosecutor, if the judge rejects it, the defendant can withdraw his guilty
plea and ask for a trial if he wants. 307 However, in a case like this, where
the prosecutor agrees only to recommend a sentence, the judge is still
free to reject the (recommended) sentence, but the defendant is stuck
with his guilty plea. 308
So, I told Coach, in this case, the judge told the defendant that the
one year sentence was only a recommendation; but later, at the sentenc-
ing hearing, the judge gave him 10 years, with six suspended con-
ditioned upon successful completion of a sex offender treatment pro-
gram. 309 Coach's immediate response to this sentence, four to ten times
longer than that recommended by the prosecutor, was that it was a "bait
and switch." I reminded him that the defendant had been told the one
year sentence was only a recommendation, to which the judge was not
bound, and although it wasn't clear to me from the opinion, it appeared
that the North Dakota Supreme Court believed that the defendant was
told that he wouldn't be able to change his mind later if the judge didn't
follow the recommendation. 3 10
Coach wasn't convinced. Neither was Justice Levine. 311 Both
believed that a person in the defendant's situation would understand that
the judge and the lawyers were part of a system which was telling him
that he would be quite a bit better off if he would plead guilty and save
the system the time and trouble of a trial. 3 12 The system of plea bargain-
ing of course, doesn't work without that wholesale institutional reality.
At retail, the recommendation of a central player in the system, the
prosecutor, is reasonably considered more significant to the defendant
than the solemn incantations of the judge that the court is not bound by
the recommendation. Nonetheless, the defendant is bound by his guilty
304. See id. at 735; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(l)(d) (Supp. 1995) (prohibiting
sexual intercourse with someone under fifteen years of age).
305. Halton, 535 N.W.2d at 735, 737.
306. Id. at 736.
307. Id.; see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11 (d)(4).
308. Halton, 535 N.W.2d at 736.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 736-37.
311. Id. at 739 (Levine, J., dissenting) (stating the defendant ought to be allowed to withdraw a
guilty plea following an unaccepted sentence recommendation).
312. Id.; see also State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315, 320-21 (N.S. 1993) (Levine, J., dissenting).
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plea in the sense that he can't withdraw it just because this time, although
he took the bait, the judge made a big, big switch.
Justice Levine's dissent relied on her previous dissent on the issue
two years earlier in State v. Thompson.313 There, she found persuasive
the Michigan Supreme Court's decision based "on the defendant's
perspective" that a judge rejecting a recommendation should allow
withdrawal of the guilty plea.314 She quoted from the Michigan opinion:
"Although the prosecutorial 'recommendation' would
seem to inform the defendant of the consequences of his plea
that the prosecutor is merely suggesting a sentence and that the
judge is not bound to follow the recommendation -the truth is
that most defendants rely on the prosecutor's ability to secure
the sentence when offering a guilty plea. This is true even
when the court specifically admonishes the defendant that it is
not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. All disclaim-
ers that the court is not bound are often viewed as ceremonial
incantations.
"To most defendants, the distinction between a sentence
agreement and a sentence recommendation is little more than a
variation in nomenclature." 315
The point is not that the majority in Halton is wrong,3 16 and Justice
Levine, Coach, and the Michigan Supreme Court, are right. 317 Instead, I
offer this as an example of Justice Levine's empathy (to use Coach's
non-professional benchmark) and her ability to see different sides to a
question that appears legally cut-and-dried to less empathetic judges.
Or, to use White's term, it is an example of her openness.
Of course, Coach did not really understand that in jurisdictions such
as North Dakota, without sentencing guidelines or appellate review of
legal sentences, there is no standard whatsoever for proper sentencing
within the legislatively prescribed range. Sentencing judges have virtual-
313. 504 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1993).
314. State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315, 320 (N.D. 1993) (Levine, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (quoting People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Mich. 1982)).
316. Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court's position appears to be the majority position. See
e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE vol. 1, § 175.1, vol. 5, §§ 537-539 (2d
ed. 1982) (discussing the federal approach under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I l(e)(1)(B)).
317. Chief Justice VandeWalle, concurred in the majority opinion in Thompson, agreeing with
the majority's result under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(d), but also agreeing with
Justice Levine that the Rule should be amended to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea.
Thompson, 504 N.W.2d at 319 (VandeWalle, CJ., concurring). He observed that "[a]lthough such a
procedure may result in less realistic plea bargaining by the defendants, that result is, in my opinion,
outweighed by the real possibility that defendants do not always understand the Rule 11 process as
well as prosecutors, defense counsel and judges would like to believe." Id. at 319-20. Apparently that
possibility was not worth another separate opinion, as he concurred in Halton without comment.
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ly absolute and unreviewable discretion, absent disclosure of an uncon-
stitutional factor. In other words, there are no legal limits to the sentenc-
ing process, absent a showing of constitutionally suspect factors such as
race or religion.3 18 Thus, with the bliss of ignorance, he asked a ques-
tion that in our system seems to have not only no good answer, but no
answer at all: why did the prosecutor recommend the light sentence if
the judge knew the defendant deserved more? But that's a subject for
another essay.
I believe that Justice Levine demonstrated White's criterion of
openness to other views, Dworkin's ideal of a Herculean judicial quest
for principled opinions, and Coach's wish for judicial empathy. Because
such a combination of judicial attributes is so rare, she will be missed.
Her quest merited her synonymous title: Justice.
318. Footnote one of Halton really makes clear how unguided and strange our system is, es-
pecially compared to United States jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines or European jurisdictions,
such as Norway, where a primary function of appellate courts is to review sentences and provide
what becomes, in effect, a common law (meaning judge made) set of sentencing guidelines.
1. North Dakota state courts are not bound by sentencing guidelines. A list of factors
to be considered is found in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04. The statute does not control the trial
court's discretion and the court does not have to explicitly refer to the factors at
sentencing.
Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(6), the trial court is to prepare a written statement to
accompany the sentence. The statute does not change our review of the court's
discretion. Ennis at 382.
These sections do not require a sentencing court to make explicit reference to the
factors and do not affect the trial court's discretion. Contrary to Halton's contention, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to specifically address the sentencing
factors.
535 N.W.2d at 739 n.1 (citation omitted).
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